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We generalize the Boadway and Keen (2006) model of adverse selection in
capital markets to allow for risk aversion on the part of entrepreneurs. We use
thistoanalyzetwotypesifpolicies. Weﬁrstconsiderpoliciesthatwouldallow
entrepreneurs to use a greater fraction of their total wealth in ﬁnancing their
projects, thus allowing them to reduce reliance on debt or equity ﬁnance by
outside investors. We show that such policies may not be welfare improving
because it exposes entrepreneurs to more down-side risk. This result high-
lights the importance of allowing for risk-aversion since policies that aim at
alleviating inefﬁciencies associated with adverse selection may increase risk
exposure and ultimately reduce welfare. We, then, consider how the tax treat-
ment of losses affects social welfare. We show that if a society places a high
value on distributional equity or if entrepreneurs are sufﬁciently risk averse,
a full-loss offset system may be desirable even when there is excessive invest-
ment. Keywords: Adverse selection, debt, equity, tax policy. JEL codes: H20, G14.
1 Introduction
Since the 1970s, economists have recognized that capital markets do not always
conform to the model of an idealized market where individuals and ﬁrms can al-
ways borrow funds at an interest rate that accurately reﬂects the degree of risk
∗Carlos E. da Costa thanks the hospitality of the MIT. He and Luis Braido acknowledge ﬁnancial
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1posed by their investment projects. One major source of capital market imper-
fection is asymmetric information between outside investors and entrepreneurs.
In many instances, entrepreneurs have better information than outside investors
about the probability that the investment will be successful, giving rise to a prob-
lem of adverse selection.
There is a good deal of controversy concerning the impact of adverse selection
in economies with simple ﬁnancial contracts, such as debt and equity. Two key pa-
pers in this literature—Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and de de Meza and Webb (1987)—
focused on economies with a competitive debt market and drew conﬂicting conclu-
sions regarding the implications of adverse selection for investment. Stiglitz and
Weiss concluded that adverse selection reduces investments and that resource allo-
cation can be improved by subsidizing the interest rates on loans. Using a variation
of that model, de Meza and Webb concluded that adverse selection results in ex-
cessive investment, in the sense that some projects with an expected return that is
below the opportunity cost of capital will be ﬁnanced. Thus, resource allocation
could be improved by taxing the interest rate on loans.
Whether adverse selection coupled with debt/equity ﬁnancial markets leads to
excessive or inadequate private investment has potentially important implications
for public policies, including tax policies. A symposium in the February 2002 issue
of The Economic Journal contained a number of theoretical and empirical studies
on the implications of asymmetric information for capital markets. In summarizing
the debate, Cressy (2002) concluded that given our current knowledge about the
performance of capital markets, the best advice that economists can give govern-
ments is “to do nothing,” i.e., do not intervene by providing subsidies or imposing
taxes.
Recent papers by Hellmann and Stiglitz (2000) and Boadway and Keen (2006)
have extended the basic framework by allowing entrepreneurs to ﬁnance their
projects using either debt or equity from outside investors.1 Boadway and Keen
(2006) showed that de Meza and Webb (1987)’s excessive investment result holds in
an adverse selection model with debt and equity ﬁnancing, in which entrepreneurs
and outside investors are both risk neutral.
The Boadway and Keen’s excessive investment result challenges the prevailing
1See also Fuest et al. (2003) and Fuest and Tillesen (2005) on adverse selection in capital markets.
While Fuest and Tillesen (2005) explore occupational choice questions, Fuest et al. (2003) address the
question of whether closed end subsidies may characterize optimal policies when individuals are
risk neutral and markets present adverse selection problems very similar to ours.
2view that capital market imperfections result in deﬁcient investment, especially by
smallstart-upﬁrms. However, theirassumptionthatentrepreneursarerisk-neutral
is troubling because, at least in the conventional view, most entrepreneurs are risk
averse and not able to hold diversiﬁed portfolio of assets. Their investment in their
own ﬁrm represents the bulk of their wealth, and therefore they are exposed to a
major source of risk if their ﬁrm should fail. Essentially, two sources of market fail-
ure could be operating at the same time: adverse selection in a debt/equity capital
market structure, which leads to excessive investment in projects with negative net
present values; and the entrepreneur’s inability to diversify risks, which leads to
inadequate investment in high-risk projects.
The risk-sharing possibilities in our model are exogenously restricted by the
types of ﬁnancial contracts allowed in the economy, namely debt and equity. This
restricted contract space is sometimes justiﬁed by the existence of transaction costs
thatwouldpreventgeneralmechanismsthatwerecontingentontruthfulannounce-
ments about the hidden characteristics of the productive projects. We claim that
our framework is an appropriate one for representing capital markets in some
economies, and it provides useful insights regarding economic policies that need
to be assessed within the context of a model that incorporates those two sources of
distortions, adverse selection and non-diversiﬁed risk.
There is now a large literature on the determination of entrepreneurship. Early
contributions to this literature by Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) and Kanbur (1979)
contain models of entrepreneurship where individuals differ in their degree of risk
aversion. In contrast, individuals in our model exhibit the same degree of risk aver-
sion and have the same amount of wealth. They differ in the privately observed
characteristics of their productive projects. This gives rise to an adverse selection
problem that is not captured in these early models of entrepreneurship.
It is not our intention to review the recent literature on entrepreneurship, but
we do note that the recent paper by Jaimovich (2010) most closely resembles our
framework.2 In his overlapping generations model, the only form of outside ﬁ-
nancing is equity investment. There are only two types of potential entrepreneurs,
and the only risk that the high-type entrepreneurs face is the probability of fail-
ure. Consequently, although Jaimovich’s model contains an interesting dynamic
structure, it does not encompass the wider range of ﬁnancing possibilities and in-
vestment outcomes that our model considers and does not capture the possibility
2See also the recent work by Hopenhayn and Vereshchagina (2009).
3of equilibrium with excessive investment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we general-
ize the Boadway and Keen model by allowing agents to be risk averse. Simula-
tions of the model in Section 3 show that their excessive investment result does
not necessarily hold in this context. Total investment in risky projects declines
with the degree of risk aversion, and there is a distortion in the mix of projects
that are ﬁnanced. Some projects with relatively low expected returns and negative
net present values are ﬁnanced, while others with positive net present values—but
with high risk of failure—are not undertaken.
In Section 4, we consider two types of government policies that affect the vol-
ume of investment and the types of projects that are ﬁnanced. First, in Section 4.1,
we use the model to analyze the effects of policies that would enable agents to uti-
lize a larger fraction of their total wealth to ﬁnance investments. We show that such
policies will have an ambiguous effect on the expected utilities of entrepreneurs
because, while their interest payments on debt ﬁnancing will decline, they will be
exposed to greater down-side risk if their project fails. Agents endowed with high-
risk high-return projects are most likely to be made worse off when more of their
wealth has to be invested in a risky project. Consequently, investment in risky
projects may decline, and social welfare may or may not increase. These numeri-
cal results are aligned with the theoretical underpinnings in our companion paper,
Braido et al. (2010), which considers an economy with debt ﬁnancing only.
In Section 4.2, we consider how the tax treatment of losses can affect the level
of investment and compare the social welfare gains of tax systems with a full-loss
offset. Our simulations show that when entrepreneurs are risk neutral and there
is excessive investment, social welfare can be improved by a reduction in the rate
at which entrepreneurs are compensated for their losses combined with a revenue
neutral reduction in tax on gains. (This tax policy reduces investment in projects
with high risk and low return.) However, our results also indicate that if a soci-
ety places a high value on distributional equity or if entrepreneurs are sufﬁciently
risk averse, a full-loss offset system may be desirable even when there is excessive
investment.
Our main results are then summarized and commented in Section 5, which
serves as a conclusion.
42 AModelofAdverseSelectionwithRiskAverseEntrepreneurs
The economy is inhabited by a continuum measure one of agents, whose prefer-
ences are represented by expected utility functions with identical constant relative





, for σ ≥ 0 and σ ￿= 1; (1)
and
u(W) ≡ log(W), for σ = 1; (2)
where W ∈ R+ represents individual consumption wealth.
All agents are potential entrepreneurs. Each of them is endowed with a project
that requires one unit of wealth if it is to be realized. Projects are characterized by
their probability of success, 0 <p≤ 1; and the magnitude of their return if they
are successful, R>0. If the project is unsuccessful, the return is zero. Returns
on the individual projects are uncorrelated; and agents privately know the (p,R)
characteristics of their own projects.
Thiseconomyalsohasacontinuumofpotentialoutsideinvestorswhoseoppor-
tunity cost of capital is given by an exogenous risk-free real rate of return, r ≥ 0.
Outside investors know the joint distribution of p and R across all projects and are
aware that each agent is privately informed about the characteristics of his project,
(p,R).
The agent’s wealth consists of two types of assets. One asset, L, cannot be used
to ﬁnance investment in the project. For example, L could be the earning of some
family member or an asset that cannot be pledged as security for a loan because
of legal restrictions or the absence of full property rights. The other asset, K, can
be used to ﬁnance investment in the risky project. We assume that K<1 and,
therefore, the agent requires outside ﬁnancing in order to make the investment in
his project. Deﬁne ϕ ≡ 1−K>0 as the level of outside investment that is required
to ﬁnance a project.
Debt Financing Let us ﬁrst consider the case in which entrepreneurs can ﬁnance
their projects in a competitive debt market. The interest rate on debt ﬁnancing for
these projects is i ∈ R+. If the agent invests in the safe asset, he will have a secure
amount of wealth given by:
Ws ≡ L +( 1+r)K = L +( 1+r)(1− ϕ). (3)
5If an agent borrows to ﬁnance a project, his wealth is:
W1B = max(L,R+ L − (1 + i)ϕ), (4)
in case of success; and
W0B = L, (5)
in case of failure. Notice however that agents with R<(1 + i)ϕ will never apply
for a loan, since this would imply a consumption level below Ws in all scenarios.









, for 0 ≤ σ ￿= 1; (6)
and
EUDF = plog(W1B)+( 1− p)log(W0B), for σ =1 . (7)
Agents will prefer debt ﬁnancing their projects to investing K in the safe asset
if EUDF ≥ [Ws]
1−σ /(1−σ). We can use (3) and (6)-(7) to deﬁne a function Z(p) that
partitions the space p × R, through (8), in two different sets: the locus (p,R) such
that agents opt to become entrepreneurs (through debt ﬁnancing their projects);
and the locus for which they opt not to do so. That is, agents choose debt ﬁnancing
over investing in the safe asset whenever:
















, for σ =1 . (10)
The term Z(p) − L is always positive.3 Moreover, Z (·) is decreasing in p and
increasing in σ. It can be interpreted as the level of wealth that the agent needs
if the project succeeds in order to make the expected utility with a debt-ﬁnanced
investment equal to the utility from investing in the safe asset.








1−σ, which is impossible
since Ws >L .
6If the agents are risk neutral, inequality (8) can be written as:
R ≥
(1 + r)(1− ϕ)
p
+( 1+i)ϕ. (11)
In Figure 1, which shows the Boadway and Keen equilibrium with risk neu-
tral agents, the BB￿ curve represents the projects with (p,R) values such that risk-
neutral agents are indifferent between investing in their project using borrowed
funds and investing their wealth in the safe asset.
In equilibrium, competition among lending institutions implies that the market
interest rate on debt is determined by the following condition:




where ˆ p is the average probability of success (and therefore repayment of a loan) of
debt-ﬁnanced projects, r is the risk-free rate of return that the lending institutions
pay to their depositors, and E[·] is the mathematical expectation. (It is implicit in
this reasoning that lending institutions hold a well-diversiﬁed portfolio of loans so
that they can be treated as risk neutral.)
Equity Financing Now consider equity ﬁnancing by outside investors. Agents
endowed with project (p,R) can issue equity shares against the project’s return.
The number of shares issued by each ﬁrm is normalized to one. The price of each
share, V , is given by the stock-market value of the ﬁrm. All ﬁrms have the same
equity value since they are ex ante identical for outside investors.
Equity investors receive min(ϕ/V , 1) of the proﬁts if the project is successful,
and 0 otherwise. Equity-ﬁnanced entrepreneurs, on the other hand, receive 1 −
min(ϕ/V , 1) if the projects succeeds, and 0 otherwise. Their contingent wealth is:
W1E = R(1 − min(ϕ/V , 1)) + L, (13)
in case of success; and
W0E = L, (14)










, for 0 ≤ σ ￿= 1; (15)
and
EUEF = plog(W1E)+( 1− p)log(W0E), for σ =1 . (16)
7Agents will use equity to ﬁnance their projects (instead of investing all their
resources in the safe asset) whenever
EUEF ≥ [Ws]
1−σ /(1 − σ). (17)
Notice then that projects such that ϕ/V ≥ 1 will never be equity ﬁnanced. Inequal-




[Z (p) − L], (18)
where Z(p) is as deﬁned in (9).




(1 + r)(1− ϕ)
p
. (19)
The EE￿ curve in Figure 1, shows combination of (p,R) values such that risk-
neutral entrepreneurs are indifferent between equity ﬁnancing and investing their
wealth in the safe asset.




pR | R ≥ V




In words, the value of a ﬁrm is equal to the present value of its expected return,
conditional on equity ﬁnancing, discounted at the risk-free rate of return.
TheChoiceBetweenEquityandDebtFinancing Someentrepreneursthatwould
accept to use equity to ﬁnance their projects may actually prefer debt ﬁnancing.
Notice that, in our model, the entrepreneur’s degree of risk aversion does not af-
fect the preferred method of ﬁnancing. This occurs because entrepreneurs must
always invest K>0 from their own wealth into the project.4 For the same reason,
agents have no motivation for mixing debt and equity to ﬁnance a given project.
Debt ﬁnancing is preferred to equity ﬁnancing whenever EUEF <E U DF. From
(6)-(7) and (15)-(16), this is equivalent to saying that:
pR(1 − (ϕ/V )) <p (R − (1 + i)ϕ). (21)
4This is equivalent to assuming that, in case of bankruptcy, the entrepreneurs are legally respon-
sible for debts up to the amount K>0.
8From this reasoning, entrepreneurs are indifferent between debt and equity ﬁ-
nancing when:
R =( 1+i)V. (22)
The curve MM￿ in Figure 1 represents the projects for which agents are indifferent
between debt and equity ﬁnancing. An agent with a project whose R lies below
MM￿ will prefer equity ﬁnancing to debt ﬁnancing.





L1−σ − [(V − ϕ)(1+i)+L]




log[(V − ϕ)(1+i)+L] − log(L)
, for σ =1 . (24)





Therefore, entrepreneurs with projects whose (p,R) values that lie above the
line segment BJM￿ in Figure 1 will ﬁnance their projects with debt. The projects
with relatively high R values are debt-ﬁnanced so that the owners do not have to
share the high returns with outside shareholders. Entrepreneurs with projects in
theregionJM￿E￿ willbeﬁnancedinthestockmarket. Equityﬁnancingisattractive
for agents with projects with relatively low R values and relative high probabilities
of success.
The projects where the expected rate of return is greater than or equal to the
rate of return on the safe asset satisfy the condition pR > (1 + r). In Figure 1, all
of the projects that satisfy this condition lie on or above the FF￿ line. These are the
projects that would be ﬁnanced under symmetric information by risk neutral in-






where pMEB <p MF. Therefore, point A in Figure 1 lies to the right of point J.
9Market Equilibrium Equilibrium in this economy is given by an allocation—
namely, three loci of projects (p,R) that are debt-ﬁnanced, equity-ﬁnanced, and
not undertaken—and a vector of prices (i,V ) such that agents maximize expected
utility and the debt and equity markets satisfy the zero-proﬁt conditions (12) and
(20). As previously described, the individual optimal decisions are summarized by
conditions (8), (18), and (21).
Figure 1 illustrates Boadway and Keen’s over-investment result with risk neu-
tral agents. The debt-ﬁnanced projects in the region BJAF will have a negative
expected net present value because the FF￿ and the BB￿ curves intersect at the
probability level ˆ p and FF￿ is steeper than BB￿. Also note that the EE￿ curve is
always below the FF￿ curve. In equilibrium, V is greater than one. (V can be in-
terpreted as Tobin’s average q.) The equity-ﬁnanced projects in the region JE￿F￿A
will have negative expected present values. Thus, the Boadway and Keen model
predicts that all of the projects with positive expected net present values will be
ﬁnanced and that some projects with negative expected net present values will be
also be ﬁnanced either by debt or equity.
If agents are risk averse, it is possible that some projects with a positive net
present value will not be ﬁnanced. Intuitively, pMEB increases as the degree of risk
aversion increases—holding V and i constant—which shifts point J in Figure 1 to-
wards point A. This reduces the region of over-investment. Note, however, that as
the degree of risk aversion changes and poor projects are dropped, the equilibrium
values for i and V will also change. Our intuition suggests that i will decrease and
V will increase as risk aversion increases, which would have offsetting and there-
fore ambiguous effects on the position of the J and A. Therefore, an equilibrium
analysis is required to assess the full effect of an increase in risk aversion on the
level of over-investment.
In addition to that, the slopes of the BB￿ and EE￿ curves will also change when
agents become more risk averse, creating the possibility that the BB￿ curve may
intersect the FF￿ curve above the MM￿ line. Therefore, some projects with low
probabilities of success—but high returns and positive net present values—will
not be undertaken by agents because they are too risky.
In summary, when agents are risk averse, some projects which should not be
undertaken will be undertaken, while some projects which should be undertaken
will not be in equilibrium. The ﬁrst type of inefﬁciency occurs for projects with
high probability of success and low conditional return, and the second for projects
10with low probability of success and high conditional returns. Given the complexity
of the model, it is not possible to pin down the exact conditions leading to under-
or over-investment. We shall rely on numeric exercises to illustrate our results.
3 Equilibria with Excessive and Inadequate Investment
We present here some numeric exercises in which the equilibrium exhibits ei-
ther excessive or inadequate levels of investment, for different parameters. The
model is simulated with the following parameter values: r =0 .05, ϕ =0 .60, L =
0.80, K =0 .40, and Ws =1 .22. The distribution function is f(p,R)=θe−θR, where
θ =1 .25. With this distribution function, p(R>1) = 0.287, p(R>2) = 0.082,
E(p)=0 .5, E(R)=0 .80, E(pR)=0 .40. The area above the FF￿ curve—which
measures the proportion of the projects with positive net present values evaluated
at the risk-free rate of return—is 0.095.
Table 1 shows the computed values of the key endogenous variables with three
different levels of risk aversion. In the ﬁrst column, for comparative purposes, we
report the equilibrium values for the case with risk-neutral agents. In this case, the
interest rate on debt is 63.1 percent. (One of the reasons why the interest rate is
so high in this model is that we have assumed that the investment has no scrap
value if it fails.) The market value of the shares in the ﬁrms that are ﬁnanced by
equity investment is 1.109. The average probability that a debt ﬁnanced ﬁrm will
repay its debt, ˆ p, is 0.644. In other words, 35.6 percent of the debt-ﬁnanced projects
defaultontheirloans. Thisalsoexplainsthehighinterestrateondebtinthismodel.
Figure 2a shows the MM￿ curve and the relevant sections of the BB￿ and EE￿
curves, now labelled as BE￿, intersect at the 0.506 probability level. As noted in
the previous sections, excessive investment is a characteristic of the equilibrium
with risk-neutral agents. About 7.24 percent of all projects are debt ﬁnanced and
5.54 percent are ﬁnanced by equity. The total percentage of projects ﬁnanced, 12.8
percent, exceeds the 9.5 percent of the projects with positive net present values.
The second column presents the case in which the coefﬁcient of relative risk
aversion is 0.90. In this case, the interest rate on debt drops to 49.7 percent, because
the probability that a debt-ﬁnanced entrepreneur will repay its debt increases to
0.701. The market value of shares in the ﬁrms that are ﬁnanced by equity invest-
ment remains at 1.109. As Figure 2b shows, the MM￿ and the BE￿ curves now in-
tersect at a much higher probability level, 0.623. This equilibrium is characterized
11by both excessive investment and under investment. (The FF￿ curve lies above the
BE￿ curve in the range of p values from about 0.22 to 0.60 and below the BE￿ curve
for p<0.22.) In other words, there is under-investment in some projects with pos-
itive net present values and high risk because agents are unable to diversify the
project’s risk. In this equilibrium, 7.23 percent of all projects are debt-ﬁnanced and
3.80 percent are ﬁnanced by equity. The total number of projects ﬁnanced, 11.0
percent, exceeds the fraction of projects with positive net present value, namely 9.5
percent.
In the third column, where the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion is 2.00, the
interest rate on debt drops to 35.0 percent, because the probability that a debt-
ﬁnanced project will repay his debt increases to 0.778. The market value of the
shares in the ﬁrms that are ﬁnanced by equity investment falls slightly to 1.096. As
Figure 2c shows, the MM￿ and BE￿ curves now intersect at a higher probability
level, 0.756. Now the equilibrium is characterized by under investment. The FF￿
curve lies almost completely below the BE￿ curve indicating signiﬁcant under-
investment in projects with positive net present values. Only 6.68 percent of all
projects are debt ﬁnanced and only 1.98 percent of projects are ﬁnanced by equity.
The aggregate level of investment, 8.66 percent of the total number of potential
projects, is below the fraction of projects with positive net present values.
These simulations show that the excessive investment result does not neces-
sarily hold in a debt/equity capital market with adverse selection and risk averse
agents. Our numerical simulations indicate that the number of projects that are
ﬁnanced can either exceed or fall short of the number that would be ﬁnanced in a
frictionless economy. What the model reveals is a distortion in the mix of projects
that are ﬁnanced—some projects with low expected returns are ﬁnanced, while
some high risk projects with positive net present values are not.
It is important to emphasize that this is not a calibration exercise. That is, we
did not choose parameters to try and match equilibrium values of some target vari-
ables. Instead, we chose functional forms and parameters that facilitated both our
exposition and the numeric computations. In particular note that our choice of a
zero scrap value for the project induces a counterfactually high value for interest
rates. We do not believe that any of these choices are driving the under-investment
results. Indeed, under-investment is fundamentally linked to the downside risk
faced by entrepreneurs, which is not directly affected by the equilibrium interest
rate.
124 The Welfare Effect of Government Policies
We investigate now the effects on social welfare of two different policies. First,
we exam the effects of increasing the fraction of wealth that agents can use in ﬁ-
nancing their projects. Our numerical exercise here consider an economy with debt
and equity markets. (In a companion work, Braido et al. (2010), we derive similar
theoretical results for an economy with debt ﬁnancing only.)
Second, we consider how the tax treatment of losses affects the level of invest-
mentandsocialwelfareinoursetting.5 Manyeconomistshavearguedforgenerous
tax treatment of losses in order to promote risk taking—see Domar and Musgrave
(1944), Mossin (1968), Stiglitz (1969), Mintz (1981), and Gentry and Hubbard (2000).
However, most tax systems treat gains and losses asymmetrically, with the tax rate
on gains exceeding the rate at which losses are compensated. As our previous anal-
ysis has indicated, it is not clear whether public policy should promote risk-taking
or discourage it with those types of capital market distortions.
4.1 Increasing the Proportion of Wealth Available to Invest
An increase in K, with an offsetting reduction in L, has two effects on the in-
centive to invest in the risky project. First, the opportunity cost of investing in the
risky projectincreases bythe rdK, andtherefore some entrepreneurswith marginal
projects will ﬁnd investing in the safe asset more attractive. Second, entrepreneurs
will not have to borrow as much and their interest payments will decline, but at the
same time they will face greater down-side risk because of the reduction in L. Con-
sequently, the expected utility of entrepreneurs may either increase or decrease.
To see this, we can write the expected utility of an entrepreneur with a debt-
ﬁnanced project as EUDF = pU (R + L − (1 + i)ϕ)+( 1− p)U(L), since in equilib-
rium debt-ﬁnanced projects display R>(1+i)ϕ, as remarked in Section 2. Hence,















U￿ (R + L − (1 + i)ϕ)
U￿ (L)
, (27)
5Kanbur (1982) and Kihlstrom and Laffont (1983) also deal with the effect of taxation on en-
trepreneurship, but their framework is quite different from ours. In particular, in their models, risk-
averse entrepreneurs face a uncertain production shock, but all potential entrepreneurs have face the
same ex ante return. Thus, the adverse selection problem does not arise in their models.
13wheredi/dK isthechangeintheequilibriuminterestrateonloanstoentrepreneurs
and i − ϕdi/dK is the reduction in the entrepreneur’s interest payments from a
small increase in K and an offsetting reduction in L, which shifts wealth from the
loss state to the success state of the world.
An entrepreneur’s marginal rate of wealth substitution between the two states
of the world is given by the right hand side of the second set of conditions in (27).
An entrepreneur will be better off if the reduction in his interest payments exceeds
his marginal rate of substitution of wealth between the two states of the world. For
a given value of R, the entrepreneurs with low p projects have a higher marginal
rate of substitution of wealth between the two states of the world and are more
likely to be worse off when K increases and L declines. Therefore, entrepreneurs
with low p projects are the ones that are most likely to drop their projects. Conse-
quently, the default rate on loans will decrease, and the interest rate on loans will
to decline, i.e. di/dK < 0.
Holding p constant, the entrepreneurs with projects with higher R values will
have a higher marginal rate of wealth substitution, and therefore they are more
likely to be made worse off. Thus, somewhat paradoxically, reduced reliance on
outside ﬁnancing can make some entrepreneurs (with positive net present value
projects) worse off. Finally, the greater the degree of risk aversion, the higher
marginal rate of wealth substitution, the more likely that an increase in K will
make the entrepreneurs worse off.
It is important at this point to note the crucial role played by our assumption
that liability is the same for all entrepreneurs. We are, in this sense, ruling out the
use of different levels of liability as a screening device. From a purely technical
perspective, leaving the space of contracts to be only limited by the informational
structure of the economy leads to a series of difﬁculties in terms of existence, let
alone characterization. From a more practical perspective, very complicated non-
linear contracts do not seem to be the common practice, at least for the type of small
start-up ﬁrms that justiﬁes our risk-aversion assumption.
As we have seen, an increase in the amount of wealth that can be used to ﬁ-
nance investment will likely make some individuals better off and others worse
off. Therefore, to evaluate the distributional effects of a policy which increases K














14where ζ is the coefﬁcient of inequality aversion. If ζ =0 , then the social welfare
function is utilitarian. Our measure of social welfare is the equally distributed
equivalent (EDE), deﬁned as:
SWF =( 1− ζ)
−1 [U (EDE)]
1−ζ . (29)
As demonstrated in our simulations in Table 2, the level of investment may
decline when K increases and L declines. Entrepreneurs will be exposed to more
risk when they are responsible for ﬁnancing a higher proportion of the investment,
and the opportunity cost of investing in the risky project may increase.
In Case I, the entrepreneurs’ total wealth is 1.2, where L =0 .8 and K =0 .4.
They must then rely on outside investors for 60 percent of the initial investment.
Assuming σ =0 .90, r =0 .05, and θ =1 .25, the equilibrium interest rate on loans
would be 0.497, the value of a ﬁrm would be 1.109, and 11 percent of the projects
would be ﬁnanced. In Case I, with ζ =0 , the EDE wealth level is 1.254573. To put
this ﬁgure in perspective, note that those entrepreneurs that invest in the safe asset
and who have the lowest expected utility have secure wealth equal 1.22.
Case II shows the effect of reducing L from 0.8 to 0.4 and simultaneously in-
creasing K from 0.4 to 0.8. One could think of this increase in the amount of wealth
that can be used to ﬁnance investments as arising from increasing property rights
in informal housing in a developing country. Note that the entrepreneurs would
still require outside ﬁnancing for 20 percent of the projects cost. In the new equi-
librium, the interest rate on loans would decline from 0.497 to 0.308, because the
default rate on loans would decline by 10 percentage points (i.e., ˆ p would increase
from 0.701 to 0.803). The decline in the default rate reﬂects the reduction in invest-
ment. In Case II, only 6.96 percent of the projects would be ﬁnanced. Investment
in the projects declines because the entrepreneurs’ secure level of wealth will have
increased to 1.24. Hence, some marginal projects with will no longer be ﬁnanced
because the opportunity cost of investing in the risky projects has increased. In ad-
dition, some entrepreneurs with positive net present value projects will now face a
reduction in their expected utility from investing in their risky projects.
While the expected utilities of some of the entrepreneurs with good projects
decline in Case II, overall social welfare increases with a utilitarian or pro-poor
social welfare functions because some of the losers were initially better off than the
winners.
The next two cases analyzed assume that K>1 so that entrepreneurs must
self-ﬁnance their project. Case III in Table 2 the total wealth of the entrepreneurs is
15the same as in the previous cases, but they can now self-ﬁnance the project. Only
5.24 percent of the risky projects are ﬁnanced, in part because Ws increases to 1.26,
but also because of the increase in the downside risk that the entrepreneurs face
now that they ﬁnance the entire project from their own wealth. However, there is
an overall social welfare gain because of the increase in Ws to 1.26.
Case IV shows what would happen if in converting L into K, the Ws remained
constant so that there was no gain to those who only invest in the safe asset. The
entrepreneurs can self-ﬁnance their investment because K =1 .162. The compu-
tations show that only 5.01 percent of the risky projects would be ﬁnanced, even
though the opportunity cost of the investment remains the same as in Case I. This
occurs because of the greater downside risk that the entrepreneurs face. The com-
puted values of EDE wealth also decline.
Figure3showstheequilibriainCasesIandIV.InCaseIV,onlytheentrepreneurs
with projects above the SS￿ curve will undertake their project, whereas all of the
projects above the BE￿ curve are ﬁnanced by either debt or equity in Case I. All
of the entrepreneurs with projects between the SS￿ curve and the BE￿ curves are
worse off in Case IV as compared to Case I. Furthermore, the entrepreneurs with
debt ﬁnanced projects in Case I that are above the SS￿ curve, but to the left of the
curve labeled GG￿, would also be worse off. Only those entrepreneurs with debt
ﬁnanced projects in Case I that are to the right of the GG￿ curve and above the rel-
evant sections of the SS￿ and MM￿ curves are better off in Case IV. These compu-
tations show that only entrepreneurs with debt-ﬁnanced projects with high (p,R)
values would be better in Case IV than in Case I. (There are also a small number
of entrepreneurs with equity ﬁnanced projects in Case I that would be better off in
Case IV, but the area that represents those projects is too small to show in Figure 3.)
4.2 Tax Policy
Another type of public policy that affects investment decisions is the taxation
of the returns on risky investments, and in particular, the tax treatment of losses.
We study next the tax treatment of losses for a simple linear tax system. We ﬁrst
provide a brief description of how taxes can be introduced into our model. We then
simulate the effects of varying the tax loss offsets and compare the welfare gains
and losses with a full loss offset tax system.
Let investment income be taxed at the rate τ and investment losses reimbursed
16at the rate t. A tax system with full loss offsets is one where τ = t.6 The return on
the safe asset is then taxed at the rate τ and, if the individual has invested in this
asset, his wealth will be:
W￿
s =[ 1+( 1− τ)r](1− ϕ)+L. (30)
Fordebt-ﬁnancedorequity-ﬁnancedprojects, theentrepreneur’swealthinstate
0 (when the project fails) is given by:
W￿
0B = W￿
0E = L +( 1− ϕ)t, (31)
Note that we assume that the tax loss is restricted to the actual amount that the
entrepreneur has invested in the project.
If the entrepreneur debt-ﬁnance a project that succeeds, his wealth becomes:
W￿
1B = max{0 ,R− (1 + i)ϕ − τ (R − 1 − iϕ)} + L, (32)
where R − (1 + i)ϕ represents the return that the entrepreneur obtains after pay-
ing the principal and interest on loans, and τ (R − 1 − iϕ) is the tax payment. It
is assumed that the tax system allows the investor to fully depreciate the initial
investment and to deduct all of his interest payments. As we will show later, debt-
ﬁnanced projects will always have the property that R>1+iϕ, and therefore a
successful debt-ﬁnanced project will always be in a taxpaying position.
However, this may not be the case for an equity-ﬁnanced project. If the project













+ L, for R ≥ 1, (33)
where the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side is the entrepreneur’s share of the gross
return on the project, and the second term is the entrepreneur’s share of the taxes
that have to be paid on the gain from the project. Again, we assume that the full
cost of the project can be deducted from the return.
Note that it is also possible for an equity-ﬁnanced project to be successful but
incur a loss for tax purposes if 0 <R<1. Thus, the entrepreneur’s wealth will be:
6In practice, losses are not actually reimbursed but the government allows the investor to carry
them forward to reduce future tax liability. For multi-project ﬁrms, one can think that there is loss












+ L, for 0 <R<1. (34)
The rest of the model follows the previous model with the addition of these tax
variables. The BB￿ curve is implicitly deﬁned by the equation W￿
1B = Z(p) and the
EE￿ curve is implicitly deﬁned by W￿










The MM￿ curve is given by:
RM =
(1 + i)V − τ(1 + iV )
1 − τ
. (36)
By virtue of entrepreneurial selection, the return of a debt-ﬁnanced project, R, will
always exceeds RM. Thus, since ϕ < 1 <V, one must have R>1+iϕ.
Equilibrium in the debt market requires that the probability of success for a
debt-ﬁnanced project is equal to (1 + r)/(1 + i) while equilibrium in the equity
market requires that the expected return of an outside investor equals the after-tax
return (1 − τ)r that they can earn on the safe asset.
Table 3a illustrates how changes in the tax treatment of losses can affect in-
vestment in a debt/equity capital market with adverse selection. The ﬁrst column
shows the values of the key variables if entrepreneurs are risk-neutral and face a
full loss offset tax system, where τ = t =0 .30. Note that the level of total invest-
ment is virtually the same as in the equivalent no-tax case in Table 1. Since there
is excessive investment with risk neutral entrepreneurs, it is interesting to examine
the consequences of reducing t while holding total tax revenues constant, which
implies a reduction in τ. When the tax loss offset is reduced to 0.2 and the tax rate
on gains can be reduced to 0.287 while maintaining the same tax revenue as in the
tax system with a full loss offset. Total investment is reduced from 12.72 percent
of all potential projects to 12.06 percent. (Note that there is a slight increase in
the number of debt-ﬁnanced projects while the number of equity-ﬁnanced projects
declines sharply.) The interest rate and the value of a ﬁrm also decline.
We compute the certainty-equivalent wealth to measure the social gains and
losses from each of these revenue-neutral changes in the tax policy. When distri-
butional equality is not important (i.e., ς =0 ), social welfare increases when the
tax loss offset is reduced. The same result holds when there is a modest preference
18for distributional equity, namely ς =0 .5. The improvement in social welfare from
reducing the tax loss offset should not be surprising because in this case there is
excessive investment in risky projects. Reducing the tax loss offset reduces invest-
ment in the low return, high risk projects while allowing an increase in the after-tax
return on the safe asset. Note, however, that when there is a strong preference for
equality, ς =1 .5 , social welfare declines when the tax loss offset is reduced because
it adversely affects agents who have relatively low expected utilities (the marginal
entrepreneurs) while the main beneﬁciaries of this policy are those entrepreneurs
with high expected returns. Thus, somewhat surprisingly, if entrepreneurs are risk
neutralafulllossoffsettaxsystemwouldbejustiﬁedonthebasisofitscontribution
to social equality and not on its efﬁciency-enhancing properties.
Of course these results were obtained for the case in which entrepreneurs are
risk-neutralandthereisexcessiveinvestmentduetoadverseselectioninthecapital
market. It is interesting therefore to consider a case where entrepreneurs are risk
averse. Table 3b considers the case where σ =0 .9. Recall that in this case, although
there was excessive investment in aggregate, there was a distortion in the mix of
investment projects with too many low return projects and too few high risk, high
return projects. Again, we have simulated the model with a full loss offset system
with τ = t =0 .3, shown in the second column, and then we considered alternative
levels of tax loss offsets while maintaining the same tax revenue as in the full loss
offset case. The table shows that in this case when t is reduced below 0.3, social
welfare declines even when there is no social preference for equality (a utilitarian
social welfare function). We also show in this table that social welfare increases if
losses are compensated at a more generous rate than gains are taxed, even though
this implies that the tax rate on gains has to exceed 0.3 in order to maintain total
tax revenues at the full loss offset level. Of course, such generous tax treatment
of losses would not be practical if losses were affected by entrepreneurial effort
or if losses could be shifted within a corporate group through transfer prices on
intra-corporate sales. However, these computations do illustrate how important
loss offset provisions can be in sheltering entrepreneurs from risk when they are
not able to hold diversiﬁed portfolios.
195 Conclusion
This paper builds on the framework of adverse selection in capital markets
analyzed by Boadway and Keen (2006). This class of models restricts the set of
available ﬁnancial contracts to include only debt and equity. We stick with this
market structure and extend the basic setup to allow for entrepreneurial risk aver-
sion. We also introduce a secondary modiﬁcation into the model—useful for policy
analysis—that agents are guaranteed to retain the illiquid part of their wealth in
case of failure of their projects.
Boadway and Keen’s main result states that adverse selection coupled with this
capital market structure leads to excessive investment. We show that this result
does not necessarily hold when entrepreneurs’ are risk averse. This occurs because
risk aversion introduces a new source of market failure into the problem: while
adverse selection (coupled with the debt/equity market structure) leads to exces-
sive investment in projects with negative net present values; the entrepreneur’s
inability to diversify risk leads to inadequate investment on high-risk projects with
positive net present values.
This framework is also used to evaluate a policy of varying the wealth that en-
trepreneurs can use to ﬁnance investments. If institutional restrictions determine
the share of individual wealth that can be used as collateral, then a natural policy
question is how varying this fraction would affect welfare. We show that free-
ing more resources need not always be welfare improving. This may account for
why many modern societies maintain restrictions on how one may use one’s own
wealth.
We have also investigated the welfare implication of the tax treatment of losses
in this context. In debt/equity capital markets with adverse selection, there may
be excessive investment in risky projects. Reducing the compensation for losses
may help to discourage investment in such projects, resulting in a social welfare
gain if entrepreneurs are not too risk averse or if society does not place an em-
phasis on distributional equality. However, our simulations show that full-loss
offsets may be justiﬁed, even in situations where there is excessive investment, if
entrepreneurs are sufﬁciently risk averse or if society places a high priority on dis-
tributional equality.
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22A Tables and Figures
Table 1. Equilibrium Simulations
Degree of Risk Aversion σ =0 σ =0 .9 σ =2 .0
i 0.631 0.497 0.350
V 1.109 1.109 1.096
ˆ p 0.644 0.701 0.778
pMEB 0.506 0.623 0.756
Percentage of projects ﬁnanced by:
Debt 7.24 7.23 6.68
Equity 5.54 3.80 1.98
Debt and Equity 12.8 11.0 8.66
L=0 .8,K=0 .4, φ =0 .6,W s=1 .22,r=0 .05,f (R)=1 .25e
−1.25R
23Table 2. Increasing the Proportion of Wealth Available to Invest


















i 0.497 0.308 na na
V 1.109 1.165 na na
ˆ p 0.701 0.803 na na
pMEB 0.623 0.782 na na
Pctg. of Projects Financed
Debt 7.23 5.49 na na
Equity 3.80 1.47 na na
Total 11.00 6.96 5.24 5.01
Equally dist. equivalent wealth
ζ =0 1.254573 1.267364 1.281950 1.240943
ζ =0 .5 1.254159 1.267005 1.281655 1.240656
ζ =1 .5 1.253357 1.266311 1.281083 1.240101
σ=0 .90, r =0 .05, f (R)=1.25e−1.25R
24Table 3a. Tax Loss Offsets: Risk Neutral Case (σ =0 )
Tax Loss Offset, t 0.300 0.200 0.100 0.000
Tax Rate on Gains, τ 0.300 0.287 0.276 0.265
i 0.624 0.594 0.567 0.543
V 1.075 1.072 1.070 1.067
Pctg. of Projects Financed
Debt 7.45 7.51 7.54 7.53
Equity 5.27 4.55 3.96 3.47
Total 12.72 12.06 11.49 11.00
Equally dist. equivalent wealth
ζ =0 1.229296 1.230061 1.230934 1.231852
ζ =0 .5 1.223519 1.223777 1.224186 1.224679
ζ =1 .5 1.213561 1.212612 1.211804 1.211070
L=0 .80, φ =0 .60,r=0 .05,f (R)=1 .25e
−1.25R
25Table 3b. Tax Loss Offsets: Risk Averse Case (σ =0 .9)
Tax Loss Offset, t 0.400 0.300 0.200 0.100
Tax Rate on Gains, τ 0.313 0.300 0.290 0.282
i 0.570 0.528 0.492 0.460
V 1.078 1.075 1.072 1.069
Pctg. of Projects Financed
Debt 7.45 7.46 7.41 7.32
Equity 4.96 4.05 3.33 2.76
Total 12.41 11.51 10.74 10.08
Equally dist. equivalent wealth
ζ =0 1.210540 1.209368 1.208325 1.207188
ζ =0 .5 1.209974 1.208678 1.207490 1.206174
ζ =1 .5 1.208842 1.207289 1.205793 1.204090
L =0 .80, φ =0 .60,r=0 .05,f (R)=1 .25e
−1.25R
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